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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
f:_\P.L BONNER
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
1~EORGE \V. SUDBURY and
~1IES. GEOHGE W. SUDBURY, his wife, and
UETH L. DA VIS, ET AL,
Def end.ants-Respondents.

Case No.
10298

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This was an action before the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, on the comp}aint of the
plaintiff set forth in two counts:
( 1)

To quiet title to land in Salt Lake Count>:. described as follows:
Commencing 101 feet East of the Southwest

corner of Lot 3, Block 13, Plat "F," Salt Lake

City survey; running thence East 10 feet;
:forth 180 feet; West 47 feet; Nm'th 150 feet;
\\'est 10 feet; South 165 feet; East 4 7 feet;
Snnth 165 feet, to beginning.
( :2)

An action against defendants George W.
1

Sudbury and Mrs. George vV. Sudbury for t.J·'e'i··.
J(I,,
upon the property hereinabove described.
·
~

Defendants and respondents filed an ansire;
and subsequently an amended answer and counter:
claim, wherein defendants and respondents clairn.
ed an interest in the property described, to-wit
That said described property Was a public street
dedicated to the public; that defendants and respon
dents were the owners of an easement in said described land which they had used openly, notori.
ously and under a claim of right for ingress anu
egress to their property, arid on the counterclain:
of defendants and respondents, defendants 'Claim tu
be the owners of the described parcel of ground aJ11l
sought to quiet title to said property in themselves.

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The issues were framed upon the complaint of
the plaintiff in two counts:
( 1) To quiet title in plaintiff to the describeJ
land.
( 2) For trespass against the defendants for
damages and on the amended answer and counter·
claim of defendants and respondents.
The defendants set up as a defense that sait;
described property was a public street and had b~e 1
1
for over twenty-five years, and as such hiad bee .
impliedly dedi cated as a public street. Als~, th~:
defendants were the owners of an easement msa

1

1

111

2

,,.,,:, il:lcd land which they had openly, notoriously
l under a claim of right, used for ingress and
rgress to their prope1·ty. On their counterclaim, de-

fendants and respondents claimed to be the fee title

to said p1·operty and sought to quiet title in
tl1emsclves.
The court, upon defendant's motion, joined the
Salt Lake City Corporation, Mrs. John J. Hunt,
Zion's Security Corporation, Vere L. Mathews and
Shirley Seeholzer, as third party defendants. Answers were filed by Vere L. Mathews, Shirley Seeholzer and Mrs. John J. Hunt, daiming a right of
. vay in the described property by deed and at the
rrr-trial of this action, the court rules that Mrs.
1
John J. Hunt, Vere L. Mathews and Shirley SeeJwlzer had acquired their title through George and
~Iary Paramore, which title included a right of way
11 er Lhc described property in question. As to these
;hird party defendants, the action was dismissed.
(R-30, 31) The pre-trial court, at that time, conrfodecl that the only issues to be tried by the trial
1:nmt we!'e:
,11rner

( 1) ·whether or not the plaintiff has fee title

to the property in question.
(2) Whether or not the defendants have trespassed upon the plaintiff's property.
(:3) \Vhether or not the described land in question l:as become a public street under and
by virtue of the statutes of the State of
Utah. (R-30)
3

No action was taken upon the rights of Zion's Se-·nuity Corporation or Salt Lake City Corporation , an11:
no adjudication was made as to their rights, an('
said third party defendants did not file 'an answer,
although they were duly served with summons anJ
a copy of the third party complaint. (R-20, 22)
The matter came on for hearing before the Hm1.
orable Ray Van Cott, Jr., at 10 :00 o'clock A.M., nn
the 9th day of June, 1964, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah. The plaintiff introduced his evidence and witnesses and exhibits. The defendants introduced evidence, witnesses and exhibits. The court, after extended arguments and continuations, ruled on the
2nd day of November, 1964:
( 1) That plain tiff's action be dismissed witl1
prejudice on the grounds that there is no
cause of action upon which relief can be
granted in respeet to the described prope1ty.
( 2) That said property had been used for a
period of ten years by the public, and as
such, is dedicated as a public street. (R-35)
Motion for a new trial was filed by plaintiff on
the 4·th day of November, 1964. (R-36) On the 9th
day of December, 1964, plainti'ff's motion for a
new trial was summarily denied by the court. (R40) Notice of Appeal was filed by the plaintiff on
the 7th day of January, 1965. (R-44)
4

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
f'laintiff seeks reversal of the lower court's
iudgment and that this court adjudicate:
1

(1) That based upon the undisputed evidence,

plain tiff is the fee title holder of the following described property located in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah:
Commencing 101 feet East of the Southwest
cornrr of Lot 3, Block 13, Pl1at "F," Salt Lake
City survey; running thence East 10 feet;
thence North 180 feet; thence West 47 feet;
thence South 15 feet; thence East 37 feet;
thence South 165 feet, to the beginning.
(2) That this court adjudicate that defendants
and respondents have no right, title or inte1·est in and to the described property,
either by conveyance or prescription.
(3) That this court adjudicate that said described property hias not been dedicated as
a public street pursuant to the statutes of
the State of Utah, to-wit: 27-12-89, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended by the
laws of Utah, 1963. (formerly 27-1-2)
( 4) That defendants and respondents are tres-

passers 1and have no right, title or interest
of any nature in and to the property hereinabove described.
5

STATEMENT OF FACTS
It was stipulated in the record that the
erty in question is located in Lot 3, Block 18,
Lake City survey, and Exhibit No. 1, a County Pk
of Block 13, Plat "F," was by stipliation admitt'"
in evidence to show the location of the property ii
question located in Lot 3 of said Block 13. (R-5:]
54)
Plaintiff called as his first witness, Robert L
Backman, a licensed attorney in the State of Utah.
and also a registered abstracter in the State ui
Utah. (R-56) Mr. Backman testified that he Wai
familiar with the right of way set forth in Lot
of Block 13, Salt Lake City survey; that he had e~:
amined the records on file in the County Recorder',
Office to determine the fee title owner of the right
of way. (-56) Th1a:t fee title to the right of way in
question was vested in Earl Bonner, the plaintiff
(R-57) Mr. Backman testified that the chain of title
to the plaintiff, to the property in question, was as
follows:
"A. The patent to this property comes fr~w
the United States of America to Da~1el
H. Wells, as Mayor of Salt I.Jake. City:
in trust to the inhabitants of the City. I:
passed from Daniel H. Wells to George1
Paramore, I have shown as Entry tw•
of abstract compiled by L. P. Backman.
25629 and then it passed from Georf, ~
Paramore to Mary Paramore, as ?ho\ 1;
at Entry three of the continuat10n ul
Thomas Olston, Licensed Abst1•actor. An(
6

then passed from the heirs of Mary Paramore to Earl Bonner as shown on page
t2 of the abstract. There is a decree of
heil'Shi p on record determining t h a t
these people who had conveyed to Mr.
Bonner are the heirs of Mary Pai~amore
that died and that is shown on page 43
of the abstract that I have in my hand."
(R-57)
At this point, Exhibit No. 8, the abstract, showing
tlw chain of title to the pl1aintiff was, without objec,111n, introduced and accepted in evidence. (R-57)
Exhibit No. 9 was, without objection, introduced and accepted in evidence, and shows the receipt of title by the defendants, George \Vallace Sudbury and Sadie Watkins Surbury, his wife, and sets
forth the legal description of the property they receiw~d by speciial warranty deed from the Home
Owner's Loan Corporation. Said property is to the
east of the right of way in question, as shown on
Exhibit No. 1 and described as the plot belonging
to George \V. and Sadie W. Sudbury, to-wit:
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot
:3, Block 13, Plat "F," Salt Lake City survey; and running thence West 54 feet; thence
North 165 feet; thence East 54 feet; thence
South 165 feet, to the place of beginning.
.\lso, the third page of said Exhibit No. 9 shows

warranty deed whereby the defendant, Beth L.
Da\'is, received title to the property shown on Exhibit No. 1, which is to the west of the right of way
111 qur::Jion, and described as follows:
ihe

7

..
Commencing 64 feet west of the South,, .
c~rner of Lot 3, Block 1~, Plat "F," Salt L~t'
City sm·vey, and runnmg thence North 111
rods; thence West 4 7 feet; thence South 1,
r?ds; thence ~East 4 7 feet, to the place of br·.
gmmng. ( R-08)
·
1

Mr. Backman testified on cross examination
that his opinion 'as to the fee title of the property
was based solely on the records in the County R~
corder's Office; that he did not check any of the
records in the old City Recorder's Office, nor in tht
City Engineer's Office, nor in the City Assesso1'.·.
Office. ( R-58, 59)
Mr. Orson Bonner was called as a witness anu
Exhibit Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, which are photographs of the right of way in question and the adjoining properties, were introduced and 'accepted
into evidence without objection. Mr. Bonner testified that he had resided at what is known as 543 '
McClelland Street for twenty years. (R-61) That
he had lived at this present place of residence for
twenty years, and in this same area, for over forty
years. ( R-62) Mr. Bonner testified that Exhibit
No. 5 showed the right of way in question, and the
driveway which the defendant Sudbury had built,
going dff the right of way into the garage, and
which driveway and garage Sudbury had built late
in the Fall of 1962. ('R-62) Mr. Bonner further
testified that prior to 1962, thJat there was a fence
on both sides of the right of way 'and that he, and
the people in the back, or the nor'th half of Lot 3·
8

:::id mamtained this fence and right of way. (R-62)
\Ir. Bonne1· also testified, and on Exhibit No. 5
1n:1l'hd an "X" in ink, where a pole used to be maintc1ining the fence prior to the time that defendant
~,nclbury tore down the fence in order to construct
;1 garage and driveway. (R-63) Mr. Bonner testified that during the forty years that he had lived
in this Lot 3, or a portion of it, that the only people
1rhu had used the right of way, were the people
\rhu lived in the north half of Lot 3, who had a
right of way given to them, service people and
friends. ( R-64, 68, 69) That the only people who
had taken care of the right of way during the last
forty years were himself and the people who lived
in the back of the right of way. ( R-64) They had
]Jlacecl 'a "road fill" in the right of way, they had
oiled it; they had trimmed the shrubbery to keep
it clear. That 'the fence on both sides of said right
.Jf way had been there for better than fifty years.
(R-65) Mr. Bonner further testified that he had
only seen defendant Beth L. Davis and defendants
Sudbury use the right of way, prior to the time that
:\Ir. Sudbury built his driveway and garage, on one
nccosion. That on that occasion, he went down and
told Mr. Sudbury in a nice way not to use it and
that settlt>cl it. That was approximately ten years
ago. (R~65) That since 1962, when defendant Sudbury constructed his garia.ge and driveway, that he
!;acl u~ed the right of way to pull into his garage
anrl ~tet in to his house. ( R-65)
1

9

\Yi th respect to Exhibit No. 10, Mr. f3,,i1''
testified that the sign shown in this photog 3"1
"Positively No Trespassing At Any Time," V\~a 8 \11,
sign. That he originally had one out in front ai,
somebody had to ·n it down. That this pre;:;ent
had been in its present location for ove1· tweiw
years and that it was located approximately ]71
feet up the road from Sixth South Street. (R-oG1
Mr. Bonner also testified that to his knowledgr
plaintiff did not pay taxes on the right of way. Thai
apparently it had not been assessed separat€ly :,,
Mr. Cad Bonner, the plaintiff, but he assumed tha,
it had been assessed to all of the people in the north
half of Lot 3 generally. ( R-67) Mr. Bonner testified that he had not observed other people using
the right of way, thinking it was a through street.
(R-68, 69) That the city must have placed the stm t
signs in front of the right of way, as shovvn ili
Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3. (R-69) Mr. Bonner furtlm
testified that the city asphalted a portion of tht
right of way, approximately 100 feet up the alley
from Sixth South Street; and that they did not asphalt any other pm•tion of the right of way. (R
70) Mr. Bonner further testified, upon questionin1
from the court, that the "Positively No Trespassing
At Any Time" sign had been up approximate!)
twenty years and was located approximately 1811
feet back from Sixth South Street. ( R-71) Tha!
prior thereto there was another sign which wa,
. hto f way on c;j
pl!aced out on ' the front of the rig
'""' -,th
:
1

1

1

1

10

,,,uth ~treet, which was up for five years prior to

1nd which sign had on it, "Private Driveway."
iR-il) Furthe1· Mr. Bonner testified that the right
,,f 11,ay, or property in question, is not a through
1,":-· 2

~treet

and does not run through the block from

:)dh Sou th to Fifth Sou th. ( R-72)

JHrs. Orson Bonner was called to testify on behilf of plaintiff. She testified that she had resided
,1t the residence known as 543 McClelland Street,
,·:l1ich is in the north half of Lot 3, for over twenty
years, and that she is the wife of Orson Bonner.
That she was acquainted with the people who used
rhr right of way off Sixth South Street (R-72), and
identified them as Mrs. Seeholzer and Mrs. Mathews and Mrs. McKinney, their friends and service
people. These people all reside in the north half of
Lot 3. ( R-72, 73) Further, Mrs. Bonner testified
that prior to the time that defendants Sudbury con,,trnrted their driveway and garage, and pulled down
the fence as shown in Exhibit No. 5, that she had
11 nly seen the Sudburys use the right of way on one
11 c:casion and on that occasion he was stopped arid
neYer used it again. Thrat it was only after the Fall
of 1962, after defendants Sudbury constructed their
garage and driveway, that Beth Davis and the Sudbmys commenced using the l"ight of way. (R-73)
Further, M1·s. Bonner testified that prior to the
cnn~tmction of defendant's garage and driveway,
th;:u ~aid right of way had always been fenced on
\lth sirles. (R-73) Mrs. Bonner testified at R-74:
11

"A. \Vell the ~nly people th::it I know that:,,,
come up t~el'e. or been m the wrong- pla,
and come m, is people that were lookir:,.
for McClelland at 8th South or Ko~~;:
Street and they have pulled in and a~k ,·
me and they wanted Elizabeth Stree't ~1 '.
some little - "

Q.
A.

Well, in ye~r~ past it has been quite fre.
quent, hasn tit, Mrs. Bonner, that people
come and try to get through?
Not that I know." (R-74)

Mrs. Bonner further testified that the people whr,
come to the rear of the right of way are usualh
looking for someone who lives there. (R-75) Mr"
Bonner, on cross examination, testified that tl1e
street sign as shown in Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3 had
been up about twenty years; that someone from the
city attempted to take it down about twelve 01' thir
teen years ago. That she had had ra conversatioll
with this gentleman from the city, and that this
gentleman stated that the property belonged to Mr.
Bonner and he was going to take the sign down, and
Mrs. Bonner said:
"If people come to see us and don't know there
is a street there, how would they know where
we live?" (R-76)
And the man from the city stJated:
"I will leave it up 'for identification purposes,
but it is a private driveway." (R-76)
This occurred approxima!tely five or six years agii.
(R-76) Mrs. Bonner testified that the city doe~
12

collert their garbage up the right of way; that
,!it} Jrnve to take it out to Sixth South Street (R, !'L

1S)

Plaintiff called as a witness, Duane Davis. Mr.
uavis testified that he was familiar with the right
,,f way in question land that he had lived in the rear
rJf Lot >{ at one time for about three years. (R-78)
That this was about the middle of September, 1941,
tu the middle of August, 1944. That during this per'il)rl of time he had occasion to see the people using
the right uf way and that the only ones he knew who
n~ed it were the ones who lived in the north of Lot
:~ ~mcl the people who made deliveries and things
likP that. (R-78, 79) Further, th1at he did not see
anybody else using the right of way and that said
right of 'Nay was fenced at the time he was living
there. ( R-79) That he had neved seen the said right
'.rf way being used indiscriminately by the general
public and that he 'had never seen Mr. and Mrs.
SLtclbury use the right of way. That fue only time
he saw their car, it was always parked on Sixth
~outh Street in front of their place. Further, that
he harl never seen the defendant Beth Davis use the
;'ight of way. (R-79)
On crnss examination, counsel for defendant
Sudbury, at page 80 of the Record, attempted to
c' 1nfnse Mr. Davis by stating to him that the Sudbmys did not purchase their property until August
of 19 !6, intimating that Mr. Davis could ndt pos'1bl,\ h:ffe seen the Sudburys at 'this time. However,
13

at the time l\fr. Sudbury testified, he co1Tet'.t(~li
Record and stated that he was living thel'e dui 1,
1941 at the time M1·. Davis was living in the non:
half of Lot 3. (R-112, 113) Ml'. Davis futther testi.
fied that at the time he was living in the north half
of Lot 3, that there was a street sign out in fron
which said "McClelland Street." That he receiYu]
his mail there from the Post Office, and furtlwr,
that he did not know who constructed the fence Oil
either side of the right of way. ( R-80) Fmther, Mr
Davis stated that he did not remember having seen
any people come up the right of way, thinking it
was a through street, or come up there by mistake.
(R-81)
j

Vere L. Mathews was called as a witness for
the plaintiff and testified that she lived in a house
which is in the north h'alf of Lot 3, and that sht
had lived there since September of 1948. That she
was familiar with the right of way in question
that leads from Sixth South Street. (R-82) Mis~
'Mathews further testified 1thlat there was a fence
up on both sides of sa'id righ't of way from Sixtl1
South up to her property, approximately 160 feet
back from the street. (R-82) That she was familiar
with the driveway land garage which Mr. Sudbury
had constructed entering into the right of way.
( R-82) That she was familiar with the people wh.0
Had used the lane to-wit people who had come bac~
to see Mrs. McKinney, Mrs. Hunt, the Bonners an(I
mostly people who are serVicing these places, such
'

'

14

I

1

ymen delivering packages and papers. That
Jud neve1· seen the public using the street for
,iii\' other purposes. (R-83) That she had seen defri;dant Sudbm·y use the right of way on one occa~i11n, in apprnximately 1955, when he drove in and
ba<:kecl out and broke the fence of one Mrs. Hanson,
1rho Wds living there at that time. That this was
11rior to the time that he had a garage or driveway.
That neithe1· defendant Sudbury nor Betih Davis
u.;ed the l'ight of way permanently, but only on occa,,ion. ( R-83) That she had seen Beth Davis use the
1·ig·ht of way perh aps three or four times. (R-84)
Further, Miss Mathews testified that she had never
.;cPn people use the street tJhinking it was a through
sli'eet; that after Mr. Sudbury broke down the
fflnce, that a barrier was placed up there, which
could only be moved with great effort. (R-84) The
portic1n of fence 'tha:t Mr. Sudbury broke down in
1955 was the picket fence which goes 1along defend~rnt Davis' property, fronting on the right of wa'y.
,(e]i1:e1

I

1

(R-85)

Emmeline Cook was called as a witness and
testified that she was familiar with the right of way
in question; that s'he had lived there iat one time in
the n01·th half of Lot 3, approximately seventy-one
years ago, and that the right of way was their prirate property, quote:
" * our private alleyway for our property in
he back there." (R-86) Furt:lher, that said right

1
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of way was fenced on both sides and led bcicJ, .
the rear of Lot 3, up to her home. Fmther, she te~t',_
fied that she was born in the home to the east of t!i,
lane, which is occupied by defendant Sudbury, an,,
that she had been 1acquainted with the people wj,
resided in either of the homes on the east and we~:
side of said right of way. (R-87) That she harl
never seen any of the people who resided in th,
homes on the east and west of the l'ight of way me
the right of way. (R-87, 88) Further, she testifa::
that s'he had ceased to live in the north half of Ln1
3 approximately six:ty-two years ago. Fm·ther, 1fo.
Cook tesitified that the general public, during the
period of time that she was living there, never used
this right df way. (R-88) That subsequent to her
moving from this location, she had occasion to cornP
l:fack and visit her mother who was residing there.
She had never heard of any actions on the part of th~
city to declare the right of way a public right of
way in order to bring in sewage, garbage collection~
or thJings such as tha!t. ( R-89) Further, that she
was never 1aware of any dedications to the public 01
surveys made by the city. (R-89) At page 89 of th·
Record, on cross examination, counsel for defend·
ants stated :
"Q. Were you acquainted - as I understand
it from approximately 1915 to the present ~here have been some nine surwys
made wherein ithe City determined tha:
this was a public right of .way at e~c~'.
one of these times. In fact it was a Cit.
16

street. Were you acquainted with any of
these surveys 01· were you present when
any of these surveys were made?
A. No, I was not." ( R-89)
Helen Hunt was called as a witness for plaintiff. She stated that she had lived in the north half
uf Lot '.J for approximately twenty-one years. That
:~lit· was acquainted wi th the use of the right of way
·.d1irh leads to her property in the north of Lot 3;
and that she hiad observed the fence on both sides
A the nght of way during this period of time, and
Ihett the people who used this righit of way were the
1~1ilk men, the postman, anybody giving service.
(R-90) That she was acquainted with defendant
Beth Davis, and defendants Sudbury. That she had
.:een Mr. Sudbury use the right of way years ago,
-hortly after she moved there. That defendants Sudbury opened up the hedge that was growing and
'rnrtecl to use it, but they used rt very li'ttle because
hei' father had previously owned the property and
had his a'ttm·ney, Vernon Langlois, write them a letter and telephone them, and 1they stopped using the
l'ight of way. (R-91) That she had not seen them
llse it since except when Mr. Sudbury put in his
1
~arage and driveway, approxim1ately two years ago.
(R-~2) She had not seen the general publi'c us'ing
~ht" area, because, quote:
1

1

'· * your average person, unless they live
there, can't even drive out of there decently
without knocking over somebody's fence."
( R-92)
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Upon cross examination, Mrs. Hunt testifir:ci .
~he ~ad never seen individuals come up thel'(" t 11 ;; 1
mg it was a thl·ough street. (R-92)
. ~oy Larsen was called as a witness fol' th:
plamtiff and he testified that he was familial' wir:
the property in question and the right of way. Tha:
he lived in the rear of Lot 3 for approximately eigh:
years subsequent to November of 1947. (R-93) Thai
the right of way, during this period of time wa.'
fenced and closed on both sides during all of th"
period that he lived there, except for a period wh~i1
there was an opening made in the hedge to the Sudbury ldt, and that shortly thereafter, a pole w:iput in the middle of said opening to prevent it from
being used into said right of way. (R-94) That he
saw Mr. Sudbury use the right of way on the occasion when he broke the fence down, but this Wa!
the only occasion on which he had seen him use it
(R-94) That said right of way was generally on!Y
used for 'the residents in the north of Lot 3 for in·
gress and egress, and to deliver various things to
them - milk, papers and such. (R-95) Mr. Larse1:
further testified on cross examina:fion that he harl
only known of one occasion when somebody came in
the right of way by mistake, and on that occasion
the individual had walked in. That he had seen children on occasion cut through from Tenth East in th~
back yards and down through the right of way, go·
ing to school. (R-95) It was stipulated that if M~
Larsen's wife were called to testify that her test:·
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,,,., would be the same as Mr. Larsen's, her husClaude \Vells was called as a wi tness who testiLPrl that he was acquainted with the right of way
]1i1::1ted in Lot 3; that he lived there at one time when
he boarded with Mr. and Mrs. Hunt, between 1945
~iqd 194G. That he had occasion to use the right of
"'"iY in qnestion. That it was fenced at that time.
That he was not acquainted with either Mr. or Mrs.
:.udlmry 01· Miss Beth Davis. That generally, the
pel)pk he saw using the right of way were the people
who livecl in the back and that he had never seen
tLe general public traveling through there. (R-96,
1

~I/\

Shirley Seeholzer was called as a witness for

the plaintiff and testified that she resided in the

:forth half of Lot 3, and had been there since the
F'all of 1948 to the present time. That she was ac·p;ainted with the right of way in question and that
-;aid right of way had been fenced on both sides
since 1948 and she was acquainted with both Mr.
and Mrs. Sudbury and Beth Davis. Th at during
said period of time, that she had seen Mr. Sudbury
11 r Beth Davis use the right of way one or two times.
(R-98) That this was during the time when the
fPnce was broken by Mr. Sudbury when he drove in
and br0ke the fence on the Beth Davis side. ( R-98)
1'h:1t generally people who used tJhe right of way
·-ere people making deliveries to the residences in
the rear and friends going to see them. ( R-98, 99)
1
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That it was only i·ecently that defenc1ants Dai js Jn
Sudbury used the right of way, and this was ,:,n
Mr. Sudbury had put up his garage and dri~e\~.,:;·:.
( R-99) That she had never seen people g 0 i n~
through the right of way thinking it was a thl'OUQ;
street. (R-99, 100)
·Defendant called as his first witness, Paul Bar
Mr. Bay testifies that he lived at 1271 East ~1811
South, Salt Lake City. That he was an engineer foi
Salt Lake City to install and supervise signs in g~n
eral. Mr. Bay testified that the sign shown in £:.:
hibit No. 3 is a city street sign. That he did nc.1
know when said street sign was installed. (R-lOOi
Mr. Bay attempted to testify with respect to wh8t
the policy of Sal1t Lake City was in the installation
of street signs, to which question, objection \rn~
made, and the court sustained the objection. (R100, 101)
Defendant called Mr. Kenneth Yeates who testified that he was an engineer for the City Engineering Department and had been for seven years. Mr.
Yeates was shown what had been identified as Exhibit No. 11, and he testified that thi s was an offi.
cial survey of city blocks witHin Salt Lake Cit':
of 'this particular area. Mr. Yeates testified that
with respect to said Exhibit No. 11, rights of way
and public a:lleys, public rights of way and ~ubl.ic
alleys are shown on the maps of Salt Lake City. 11!
such a manner as to show whether or not the cit)«
in some performance of the various types of worfi
1
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they do, can enter therein, and in describing
rhi~ Exhibit No. 11, Mr. Yeates testified, at page
'!!<tt

1{-103:

"A. I don't like to volunteer information but
I would like to explain something here.
I don't want to mislead anybody. First
of all, rights of way and public alleys,
public rights of way and public alleys
are shown on our maps in such a manne1· as to show whether or no't the City
in some performance of the various types
of work that they do, can enter therein.
The City doesn't always denote the public but ninety percent of the time it does.
Now in this particular case, this reflects
an opening, the one that you asked about
in particular, as being open to the public
on this map." (R-103, 104)

Defendanit offered Exhibit No. 11, and upon
\'oir dire, Mr. Yeates testified that this Exhibit
No. 11 or survey could indicate either a private
J'ight of way or public right of way. (R-105) The
most that the Exhibit would show is tha!t possibly
the city would enter upon such property without
fear uf being prosecuted for trespass. (R-105)
Sarah W. McKinney was called as a witness
by defendants. She stated that she 1ived at 546 McClelland Street. She stated that she had had occasion
to see the general public, to-wit, chi1dren, using
J!IeClelland Street in front of her house, going to
school, music lessons, to see friends, etc. That there
had been some people drive up looking for addresses
1
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or who had mistaken McClelland Sti·eet f1,1 .
through street. (R-110, 111) She fmther . "
that she had lived thei'e almost eig·hteen •reai·"
T··.na,_
J
there had been a few instances ''nc t to0 recentlr ·
when people had driven up in their automobiles ·11 ~
front of her house. (R-111, 113) The last such nr·.
currence being several months ago. ( R-112)
.
~.

George W. Sudbury was called as a witness
Mr. Sudbury testified that he lived at 1035 East
Sixth Sou th, directly east of the right of way in
question. That he moved to ~his location in 19-Hi
which was cont1·ary to the statem·ent which defenJant' s counsel gave in cross examining one of plaintiff' 5s witnesses -to the effect that Mr. Sudbury
had not moved there until 1946. (R-112, 113) Mr.
Sudbury testified that when he moved into the property, there was an old, partly dilapidated fence-·
cedar posts with wires stretched on it. That as soon
a:s he could get to it, he built another fence with a
cement base and steel poles and stretched a mesh
wire along the fence on the posts. (R-113) Mr. Sud·
bury explained that over the years he had used thf'
right of way, known as McClelland Street, to haul
dirt in, to have coal delivered to his home, that thr
coal trucks went up the right of wa:y to deliver coal.
(R-113, 114) That when he converted to oil, the ~ii
trucks went up the right of way to deliver the 01l.
which was some time in 1945 or 1946, which hap·
pened for about three or four years, and he ther:
converted to gas. He further testified that he useu

1
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ig11t of 1,vay to deliver groceries to his home
,.,1rl tu l1aul lumber in when he remodeled. That he
rcnwcleiecl his home shortly after he moved in ~ 1 1)1}nt 19·12. (R-114) That he further used it for
uking gai bage out of the back of his house. (Rl1 G! The court asked Mr. Sudbury if he ever kept
his car in the backyard, and he answered at R-116:
: ,

1

·'No. \iV ell, I did too for a period of time. I
did my O'Nn car. Then the company bought the
car fo1· my use."
Further on, he testified that mostly he parked his
car 1111 the street, but on several occasions he had
parked it over in the back lot. ( R-11 7) When asked
how long hf' had done this, he said over a period
nf five or six years, back prior to 1962. Further, in
questioning Mr. Sudbury, he stated at R-117:
"Q. Now you built the garage in 1961, is that
COlTect?
A. 1962.
Q. Well, would rt be fair to say that the five
years that you parked your car, when
you were in town, was prior to 1962?
A. Prior to that, yes."
Mr. Sudbury testified that his abstract specifically stated that he had a right of way over the
ground in question. (R-119) Mr. Sudbury further
testified that before he built his garage, he investigated with the city and the City Attorney wrote a
lettPr to the effect 'that he had a right to use the
right of way. However, this letter was directed to
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Beth Davis. (R-119, 120) It should be noted, h:,.,,,_
ever, that no such letter was introduced in eviden"
by the defendant. Again at R-121, Mr. SudbUi:,
stated that he had a conveyance in his abstra
giving him a right of way over the property in que~,
'tion. However, defendant did not produce his ao
stract to verify or prove such con ten'tion. Mr. Sull·
bury further testified that he had seen defendant
Beth Davis use the right of way ever since she mm.
ed into the house approximately six or eight yea10
ago. Mr. Sudbury further testified that he had seen
a Mr. and Mrs. Hanson, the former occupants of
the Davis house, use the right of way. (R-121) The
court should note at this point that defendant Betn
Davis did not even appear to testify in the action.
(R-121, 122) Mr. Sudbury further testified that he
had seen the Hansons, as well as Beth Davis, US€
the right of way to haul out rubbish and debris in
remodeling their home. Further, Mr. Sudbury tesli·
flied that he had seen the general public using Mc·
Clelland Street on many occasions. (R-122) Particularly, where people would drive in looking fOl
a certain address they could not find, or where
children would go through there, from Tenth East
to Fifth South, going to school, or people bringing
in sewing and other jobs of that type to Mrs. Me·
Kinney, who lived in the back. (R-122, 123) Upon
cross examination, Mr. Sudbury admitted that Mr.
Bonner had placed a post in the spot where hi:
driveway to his garage now stands and the same
24

•..• 1

h1•<'il

placed there eight or nine years ago. (R-

Sa1zd1 YV. McKinney was called by the defend:lllt u1j redirect examination. Mrs. McKinney testifo·d, rvhen asked by the court if she had seen Mr.
Sudbury drive his car up to the opening in the fence,
1 eplied:

"Oh, not once a week, because he hasn't been

home."

Thl'l1 she further qualified the statement that he

rwrhaps d1•iven his car up there perhaps once a
n:unth. (R-126, 127)

Mrs. Bernessa Reynolds testified that she was
the Assistant Superintendent in the Plat Department of the County Assessor's Office and that the
l'ight of way in question had not been assessed, as
far as the records in her office showed. (R-128, 129)
Mrn. Reynolds further testified that she did not
know why the right of way had not been assessed,
even though the abstract, Exhibit No. 8, showed
that a deed had been recorded in 1951, showing title
in the plaintiff to the right of way in question.
Mr. Guy Kidder was called as a witness for
the defendant. He testified that he lived at 1044
East Sixth South Street, across the street from the
i·i.g-h't of way in question. That there never was a
fence along the right of way, but only a ladder. That
m the last ten years he had been over there fre11uently to borrow tools and help them 'in their yard
1
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work. (R-133, 134) That on occasions he had ,,11,,
Mr. Sudbury's car parked in his back yard 0,",
the past ten years. That he had seen childi·en
.·
· an11
the general public use the right of way. (R-n 41
Further, when asked to describe some of the in
stances of use, he stated:
"A. Well there are a lot of people live bad:
there that use it. I don't know all of then;
but there are four or five families anrl
I think one family has at least two ca;"
and possib~y three. The ~ilk trucks gn i~
there, mail trucks, delivery trucks of
various nature and quite frequently
there is a large truck goes in there with
boxes of some kind, I don't know what
they are." (R-134)
On cross examination, when Mr. Kidder was aske(I
how many times he had seen Mr. Sudbury's car in
his back yard prior to the time he constructed his
garage and driveway, he answered:
"A. Not too frequently because he is not home
very much.
Q. Once every three or four months?
A. At least that often." (R-136)
Mr. Kenneth L. Yeates was recalled as a wit·
ness by the defendants for redirect examination.
The court, over the objections of counsel for plain·
tiff received in evidence, Exhibit No. 11, which pur·
ported to be the 1915 Plat survey of Block 13. When
asked to interpret this map, Mr. Yeates stated:
"A. It shows that the plot of ground bounded
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by 5th and 6th South Streets and 10th
and 11th East Streets and in there is
Koneta Court, and what appears to be on
the basis of this plat a public alley, right
of way or street, on the basis of this
plat." (R-137)
I\Ir. Yeates also testified that the city formerly perfrH·rnH1 p1·ivate surveys for citizens. That the sur"·eys as set forth on the Exhibit No. 11 were requests for sm·veys which were performed as private
surveys at that time. (R-137, 138) That further,

these surveys were paid for by private citizens.
(R-138) Mr. Yeates further testified with respect
to Exhibit No. 12:
"A. This card is a result of an action by the
City.
Q. vVherein they accepted enmass various
streefa and rights of way as public entry for the purpose of performing garbage services, sewer services ,and a multitude of other public services?" (R-138,
139)

On cross examination, Mr. Yeates, when asked in
respect to Exhibit No. 12, because it states "public"
on McClelland Street, whether or not this is true.
Mr. Yeates said he did not know (R-139), that this
was for the purpose of garbage collection. ( R-139)

Mr. Orson Bonner was recalled as a witness by
the plaintiff. Mr. 'Bonner testified that he had heard
the testimony of Mr. Sudbury to the effect that he
had coal deliveries to his home and that the coal
27

~rucks came up this right of way. When askPrhrLt·,
the coal chute was located in Mr. Sudbury' 8 h,j 1"
Mr. Bonner testified that the coal chute, or cw
shed, was on the opposite, or east, side of Mr. s11 ;;_
bury's home, from the right of way, and that he l;a,1
never seen any coal trucks come up the right ui
way to deliver coal to Mr. Sudbury's home. Thi\
defendant, never denied. (R-141, 142) Mr. Bonner
testified that he had seen but one oil truck com,
up the right of way; then it pulled out and went ini''
the street and drew the hose up over the lawn 1,,
deliver oil. (R-142) Further, Mr. Bonner testifier]
tha:t this area where Mr. Sudbury built his drivewa)
into his garage was formerly a rock garden and a
hedge, which used to come up to the end of his garage. That there was some type of a ladder for ti
fence along there and a post. That he had only seer
Mr. Sudbury drive his car in this opening, on one
occasion, where his driveway is, prior to the time
df the construction of the driveway and garage,
and this was the occasion on which he had knocker!
the fence down across the alley. (R-143) That he
had seen Mr. Sudbury unload groceries through th])
supposed opening on one occasion. ( R-143)

It was stipulated between counsel and accepttll ·
by the court, that if Mrs. Bonner and Mrs. Matheiii
were called to testify on rebuttal, that their te~ 1
money would be to the same effect as Mr. Bonnen.

At this point, both plainti'ff and defendant
rested.
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ARGUMENT

nc

THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE PROVES THAT

TiTL1': TO THE RIGHT OF WAY DESCRIBED
V FOLf.OW:-3 I;:J IN THE PLAINTIFF:

\on1mencing 101 feet East of the Southwest

:·onw1· of Lot 3, Block 13, Plat "F," Salt Lake

City sm·vey, running thence East 10 feet;
thence North 180 feet; West 47 feet; South
15 feet; East 37 feet; South 165 feet, to the
beginning.
Based upon the testimony of Robert Backman, a
ii:··enstid attorney and registered abstracter, and the
ali:-:trnct, Exhibit No. 9, which was, without objection, received in evidence, title to the above described
land rests in fee simple in the plaintiff.
The llefondant did not attempt to dispute tfi,.e
chain of title or conveyances whereby the plaintiff
received t1tle to the property in question. Pursuant
tu the provisions of Section 1-1-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, the abstract is prima
facie evidence of title to the property in question.
Section 1-1-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
;1mended, provides:
"ABSTRACTS PRIMA F kCIE EVIDENCE.
- Any abstract of title certified to be true
and correct by any abstracter holding a valid
and subsisting certificate of authority from
the board, as herein provided, or by any county recorcler, shall be received by the courts of
this state as prima fac'ie evidence of its contents under such rules and regulations as to
procedure as such 'Courts may promulgate."
29

POI~T

11

THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE PROVE~ TH-1,
THE DEFENDANTS HAD NO RIGHT, EITHER R~
PRESCRIPTION OR BY DEED OF GRANT OR EASF.
MENT TO THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN POIXl j

The defendants' only evidence to prove that difenclant Sudbury had an interest in the property i!i
question, was his statement in the record to the pf.
feet that "his abstract s·howed he had a right ni
way over the property" in dispute. However. :[
should be noted that defendant did not produce u
abstract or any evidence to show chain of titk,
either by conveyance or deed of any nature thar
would have given him a right of way. Plaintiff, pmsuant to Exhibit No. 9, and the testimony of ~fr.
Robert Backman, proved that when defendants Sudbury and defendant Beth Davis received title t
the property which they own, to the east and to the
west of the right of way, that neither received~'
:!.'ight of way over said property in question.
:
1

11

Further, with respect to a prescriptive right.
neither of the defendants, Sudbm·y nor Davis, intrG
duced any evidence which would indicate, let alun
prove, that they had over the prescribed period 'JI
time obtained any prescriptive right to the properr;:
in question by either a use for twenty-one yea:·s a(iverse to the plain tiff or adverse use or possession 11'
any manner whatsoever. (See the following author·
ities.)
11
•
This court, in the case of Morris
v. Bl 11 nt ' eioi
' ··
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r,

! 1 :ti1 ~--1>),

at page 252, 253, 161 P. 1127, statea:

··.\ pre;-;c1·ipti\·e right to an easem~nt does not
~11·1:::(· in sr\·cn years, by analogy to the provisim1 or the statute barring an action to recovc; n·al p1·ope1t}~ when the person asserting
: ill e was irn c seized or possessed of the proprrty in question within seven years. These
statules do not apply to rights of way or any
:;tlier class of easements by prescription. The
right by prescription can only arise by adn,·rsc use and enjoyment under claim of right
uninterrupted and continuous for a period of
f\\·enty years. * * *"
'' •· ··· ·•· U ncler the well established rule, the
use, in order that it may ripen into a presc1·iptive title, must, in any case, not only be
arkerse and continuous, and under claim of
right for a period of twenty years, but it
must be uninterrupted throughout that periocl. In the case at bar the use of the defendants ancl their predecessors commenced in
1887, at which time there was a severance of
the title to the pa1·cels of land, and could not
ripen into title by prescription until 1907.
But defendant's own testimony shows that the
plaintiff plowed the road in question as early
as 1904, and from that time to the commencement of this action, the plaintiff, from time
to time, placed rocks in the road, from the
plowed land adjoining, and that the defendants, with shovels, leveled the ground and
removed the rocks to the north to make the
road passable; and following these acts, and
cleady indicating the attitude of each of the
parties to this suit to the claim of the defendants to the ownership of this righ't of way
at about the time the twenty-year period
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would have expired, plaintiff placed a "
gate across the road at the point wl;F ''
left ~he public highway, and the clefencl;r;,
cut it clown. From these circumstance~ ;
conclude that .the use was n_?t unintenupter!
and that no right by prescnption could aih
from these circumstances. * * *"
·
1

This court, in the case of Big Cottonwood To.·
ner Ditch Company v. lVloyle, et al, 109 Utah 2n
page 242, 17 4 P.2d 148, held 'that p1·escriptive l'igh:,
are founded upon adverse possession and not UllrHr
presumed grants. See Harkness v. Woodmanse;,;
Utah 227, 26 P. 291; Yeager v. vVooclrnff, 17 Uta 1
361, 53 P. 1045; Coleman v. Hines, 24 Utah 31i11.
67 P. 1122; 111orris 'V. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P
1127; Bolton v. Murphy, 41 Utah 591, 127 P, 3:J.i:
Farr, ct al, v. Wheelwright Construction Compa:1·1
49 Utah 274, 163 P. 256.
1

This court, in Harkness v. Woodmansee, (cil1:1i
Supra) stated at page 231:
"The statute does not, in effect, presume :
grant and give the per,son relyi_ng upon it !!ic
title from seven years possession alone .. 1:1
presumption is made from the fact that t·1·
land was held adversely; and to make th'
holding adverse the land must have be.en pr11:
tected by a substantial enclosure, or 1t mu~
have been usually cultivated or imprornl,
labor or money must have been exp~'.1decl t
irrigate it, amoun ti:r:g t? the sum of F1ve. ~~ 1 ;:
lars per acre. And m e1 ther case t~e occ~t,
tion and claim must have been contm~ou~ .
the seven years, and during that time u:•
1

11
'

1

32

•

cLlirnant, his predecessors 01· gTantors, mu.::t
Ji,t,-l paid all t.:L\cs le\·ied and assessed upon
tiw bnd according to law. This statute cloes
nl)l applv to rights of way or any other class
t't e;t:~ement by prescription. It can only be
appliL·d by analogy. The plaintiffs' use and
e11jo:n11ent of the Janel in dispute, 01· the facts
attt·nding the same, were not such as the statute abo\·e quoted requfred, or their equivaknt; lwncr a prescriptive right cannot arise
in f:wor of the plaintiffs therefrom by anal
ngy thereto. It is conceded that the use and
c·11.Jnyment, such as it was, was for less than
i'.n'nty years, so that period of limitation cannut apply. The evidence in the record proves
that defendant was using the strip of land in
cli~pute as a way to the rear of his own building, that he had gates on it a part of the time;
that he maintained a platform on the side
next to his building a la1·ge portion of the
time, \Vhich occupied three or four feet of the
way; and that his tenant was accustomed to
keep a team standing south of the platform,
a11d at such times the entire way was occupied
thereby; that defendant also had a privy on
the grnuncl a portion of the time. The evirlence tends to establish that the plaintiffs'
uRr was simply permissive, and that defendant \Vas not aware that plaintiffs were using
his land under a claim of right. Where a person opens a way for the use of his own premises, and another person uses it also ·without
eausing clamage, the presumption is, in the
nhsen(·e of evidence to the contrary, that such
use by the latter was permissive, and not unde1· a claim of right."
This com·t, in the case of Melvina Coleman v.
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...
Edmund G. Hines, (cited Supra) stated at

364:

]!''

"\Vhei·e a party relies upon his title a, 1
tained by _Prescripti~n, he must alleg: ~ ~ :
facts showmg t~e .exis~ence of the i·ight, ;
pl~ad the prescriptive right,. averring thaL::
existence was under a claim of right 1r,
pea.ceable, without !nterruption, and ope~, n
tor10us, and exclusive."
This court, in the case of Farr, et al, v. Whu1
1L'right Construction Company, (cited Supra) staied at page 277:
"It should i·equire no argument, however , ,
show that where one claims an easement ~rn
real property he should set forth his claim i1:
apt terms in his pleading. In our judgment.
the allegations in the complaint are clearly in·
sufficient to constitute a right to the use oi
the strip of ground in question under tht
claim of dedication. Respondents' counsel, a:
the trial, however, disclaimed that he ha1i
pleaded dedication. \Vhen the question of the
admission of certain evidence came up, h'
said:
" 'We are not pleading dedication; we.arr
pleading useage. * * * We claim th~ r1g!t'.
by use, jus1t as we have pleaded 1t an.
proven it.'
.
"In hif· brief he nevertheless relies upon ded!·
catio nand explains that what was meant b_1:
the foregding statement was that he h~d '.11::
pleaded and was not relying. up?n ded1rat 1.~· 1
by rp.cord or an express dedica t10n. B~t eu
though that be conceded, that it. was. JHSt ();'
necessary for counsel to plead an nnphed de r
cation as it was to plead an express grant11
that effect."
1

11

1

•

1
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POIXT Ill
1111: f~()UnT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
OF \\'AY IN QUESTION AND DESCRIBED IN
,;1
I HAD BEEN DEDICATED FOR PUBLIC USE
;,L!~ST ,-\NT TO THE PROVISIONS OF 27-12-89, UTAH
., i)lJJ: AJ\NOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED BY THE
: \\\.~ OF UTAH IN 1963. (FORMERLY 27-1-2)
1,'JiT

,:'\r

The unly basis upon which defendants serious. daim any right to use the right of way in ques111r: i:; thf' basis the court erroneously used in deter11;ning that the plaintiff had no cause of action
::garnst the defendants, to-wit: That the property
111 i 111E';tion had been deeded to the public pursuant
tr the provisions of Section 27-12-89, Utah Code
\11notatecl, 1953, as amended by the laws of Utah,
10G3. (formerly 27-1-2) In this respect, the following c:i ta tions should be noted:
Section 27-12-89, Utah Code Annota:ted, as
amended by the laws of Utah, 1963, (formerly 27l-2) provides:
"PUBLIC USE CONSTITUTING DEDICATION. - A highway shall be deemed to have
been dedicated and abandoned to the use of
the public when it has been con'tinuously used
as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten
years."
This section of the code was derived from the laws
of 1886, Chapte1· 12, Paragraph 2, and h as been an
integral pai·t of law in the state of Utah since said
date.
1

Tn the case of Thompson, et al, v. Nelson, et al,
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2 Utah 2d 340, 273 P.2d 720 (1950), this cri'
stated at page 345:
··
"We quote with app1·oval the clefinitir 1
'thoroughfare' from our case entitled M~ •
v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 249, 161P.1127 ''
1131:
'

" 'A "+-f1..
. a p1ace or \\'a.
1.a1oro~g hf are " . is
through which there is passing or trai:,1
It b~com~s a "pubfic thoroughfare" wh;ti
the public have. a general right of pas~.
age. Under this statute the highway,
even though it be over privately owner
ground, will be deemed dedicated 01' ar1andoned to the public use when the publir:
has continuously used it as a thoroug!;
fare for a period of ten yea1·s, but sud
use must be by the public. Use urnlPl
private right is not sufficient. If ti"

thoroughfare is laid out or ·used as 1:
private way, its use, howeve1' long, ii'
a private way does not make it a p11h/u
way; and the mere fact that the p11bl1r
also make use of it, without objecfini:
from the owner of the land, will not rrwk
~t a piiblic u•ay. Before it becomes p11bli
in character the owner of the land m11.~
consent to the change. Efliott, Roads ani!
1

1
1

Streets, No. 5.' "
Further, at page 345, the court stated:
'"The trial court correctly regarded the .eyi1l:
ence as insufficient to establish use sufficien
to meet the requirements of Section 27-1·~:
Utah Code Annotated above quoted,. The i:~~:.
entered from Jail Alley over a private l'J~.l
36

i·ese1·ved as such by the owner for
than fifty yearn. So far as we can deterrni1w from the evidence, the road terminated
[Jack 0£ the appellant's theatre on its private
property. The road ~eel to no place of public
interest and ended m a cul-de-sac. The use
rnac1e of the road was for delivering merc:handise and supplies and for parking to
the rea1· of buildings on Main Street in connection with the few business houses on Main
Street in the half block over which the road
extends. All of the business houses except one
owned by the Nelson defendants and two owned by appellant had a private, reserved, right
of way to their respective properties.
,f

\Va,\',

1u:1re

" 'The mere use by the public or a private
alley in common with the owners of the
alley does not show a dedication thereof
to public use, or vest any right in the
public to the way.' MacCorckle v. City
of Charleston, 105 W. Va. 395, 142 S.E.
841, 58 A.L.R. 231 and Annotation."
In the case of Clark, et al, v. Erekson, et al,
~ Utah 2d 212, 341 P. 2d 4·24 ( 1959), this court
helcl that the1·e wa'S sufficient evidence to support
the trial coul't's finding that a lane on property
'.'a~ a public i·oad and a finding as to its width. The
comt stated at page 213:

"It is appellants' contention that the evidence
fails to support the court's finding that Erekson's Lane is a public road and that it is 50
feet wide in part and 40 feet wide in part.
~We do not agree."
The court, furthe1·, at page 213, stated:
37

"The court a:s the trier of the fact" f' ,
tht
"IJli
a . a 1ane k now~ as Erekson\; Lane
i,
public road extendrng from Vine Street~~·"
to 59th South which meanders along an:.
regular route, and tha:t the west a-ncl '1
boundary lines of the parties to this ac~~~·
a: butted this road. The court further fot:(i,
1
that this road as it passes the north bounda~:
of ~ppellants' prope1·ty is 50 feet wide fo,
a di~tance of 40 feet and then narrows to onl.'
a. width ?f 4_0 feet for the remainder of fr,,
distance m dispute. The court also found tlh
for approximately 30 yea1·s appellants ar;:
their predecessors in interest had encroacht1
upon this public road by placing fences, build.
ings, trees and shrubberies thereon. The com:
there;i~on entered a decree. quiteing appt:·
lants trtle except to the public road describe1;
above abutting their west boundary line anr:
ordered appellants to remove the enmiaci:.
ments thereon."
In this particular case, there were witnesses wr
could remember back to 1890, that Erekson's Larie
had been used by the general public, ei·ther walkin,~
or r•iding in wagons and later in automobiles an,:
had been constantly used by people either goinp
church or to fish in Little Cottonwood Creek. TheL
was no evidence that permission was sought or ~ 1 •
en by anyone to use this road. On the contrary, t.h1
abstracts of title of the properties of the part1e~
to the suit showed that even before patent issu~:
by the United States in deeds given by their prerlc·
cessors in interest, the beginning points of the pr•·
perties conveyed were described as being in the er~
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. , ta n11dl1 and south country road. The court held

e\'idence sufficient to establish a dedication of
,'" ; n;tcl by user under the provisions of Section
~7-L~, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Further, the
['i'1'd helcl there was no merit to the appellant's cont11~ti(ln that the1·e was insufficient evidence to suppill'l 1.he finding as to the width of the road. A
~twnty-year-olcl witness had testified that he had
iil'l~rl in the neighborhood practically all of his life,
l1:ulcl re111embe1· from a;bout 1890, that as he came
(111111 5~lth South to Erekson's Lane, that Erekson's
Lane \Yas a least fifty feet wide from the creek all
rl1P \i/ay nmth to Vine Street. Also, the evidence
was uncontraclicted that the garage, trees, shrubberies ancl fences were not placed in their present
location until approximately thirty years before the
:11mmencement of this action and long after Erek'un's Lane was dedicated as a public highway by
'!!i;

1

l\Sel'.

In the case of Morris v. Blunt, et al, 49 Utah
2'10, 161 P. 1127 (1916), the court, at page 249,
stated:
"A dedication rests primarily in the intent of
the owner. There must be a concession intentionally made by 'him, which may be proved
by declarations or by acts, or may be inferred
from circumstances. No form or ceremony is
necessary. It must, however, appear that he
knew of the use by the public, and intended
to g1·ant the right of way to the public. No
formal acceptance by any public officer or
39

agent is necessary, but there mu::;t hr at
use by the public. * * * Quotations citi
Further, a!t page 249, the court stated:
".From the evidence, it appears that the pla:
tw.o years before the commencement,
this act10n, plowed the road to the canal ba 1,
that frequen~ly. in plowing lands atljoinu.
the road plamtiff rolled boulders from 11
land into the i·oad, which the defendants;,
moved before they could travel the road· tr
plaintiff closed the road extending west'frr
the Kersey crossing five years before the Ci''
mencement of this action; that a wire l' ·
was placed by the plaintiff across thebe,
trance to the road on the east section Ii:.
seven years before the commencement of ti·
action; and that the road was plowed by t;:
plaintiff as much as ten years before the rnr
mencemerrt of this action.

ti~f,

11

"All these facts negative an intention on 1:.
pa1~t of the plaintiff to dedicate to public lli
On the contrary, the fair inference to
drawn from them is that he intended not!
dedicate the roadway to the public. It is m
that, a dedication by the owner and an .accep:
ance by the public once made, th~ h1gh1ra
thu!; established continues to be a highway::·
long as the public use continues ; and if int;,
case the public use were sufficient to ~on~:.
tute an acceptance and 1the owner had ~n fa,
intended to dedicate then the dechc~t 11
would be complete; b~t we think there is r
evidence tending to show that there ever iv
an intent to dedicate to public use."
1

•

Again, at page 250, the court stated:
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we must conside1· the people who used
tl11:-· l'llacl. Did thei1· t1·aveling upon it constitlltl· a use by the public? The evidence disdoses th1·ee classes of persons only who used
this mad, to wit, the occupants of the Kersey
platl' and their visitors, the workmen upon
thr canal, and some persons who lived in the
middle of the section.
· \t·'\l

··As to the occupants of the Kersey place, they
hacl an express grant of a right of way for
rngress and egress contained in their title
deed (not considering now the extent or limitation of the right conveyed in the deed), so
thry \ve1·e not traveling the road by reason of
its public character, 'but under the express
provision of theii' deed.
"As ~o the workmen upon the canal, they
were the1·e under the right 'by 'user' claimed
by thei1· company. The right of way for their
canal, whatever it is, if it authorizes the occ:npancy of the land for canal purposes, carries with it the right, under reasonable limitations to enter the premises to construct, repa i 1·, and operate the canal, i'ts headgates, its
laterals, etc., which are a part of or connected
therewith. So these persons were not on this
road by reason of 1ts public charac'ter, but
under whatever right by 'user' the canal company had over this land for canal purposes."
In the case of Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305,
i1-! P. 955, a dispute arose as to a twelve foot strip
~f ground alongside a street and whether or not it
lurJ beeH dedicated to the public. The court, in its
Jlininil held that there had 'been a dedication in
1 1
~\ uf the fact that the owner of the ground had
'

1
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built a .fence to enclose his land ' leavin!Y0 the t\\rl1,
.·
r-root strip as a part of the street and that the f
.
'
enc'
had remamed there during his lifetime and at tt·
~ime of the trial some of the posts were still stand.
ing. Further, after the fence was built, a sign wa~
placed on the owner's house on which the stl'eer
was designated "Church Street," and 'the ownei·
permitted it to remain there as an index to a pub];f'
street and acquiesced in the use of the land by
public as a street. Further, the fact that the own":'
was aware that people we1·e building homes frontint
on the street, were using the street and the twelY·:
foot strip as a highway; that he had permitted
twelve foot strip to be used in common with th~
othe1· portions of the street for traffic and teanF
without interference. The com't held that thus his
conduct and acts were calculated to induce tl11
people to believe that the land was devoted to th,
purpose of a street and to lull them into security a~
to any rights they might acquire with referenc
thereto. As a result of all of this, about twenn
houses with people living in them, were frontin~
on the street. The court holding that the intention Oi
the owner being unequivocally manifested by hi;
conduct and acts. Further, the court found that th,
strip of land was necessary for the convenience anr:
accommodation of the public and that without it tiit
street would have been but one and one-half iwl~
wide, and would not have been of sufficient wirh
to permit teams to turn around. The court statf,
at page 313:
i

,

·

1
:
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'

.
'
:

"To determine the question here presented it
is in the first instance, important to refer to
tJ{e p1·inciples of law involved, and then ascertain whether, in the light of those principles,
the evidence established valid dedication, A
dedication may be either express or implied.
It is express when there is an express manifestation, on the part of the owner, of his purpose to devote the land to the particular public use, as in the case of a grant evidenced by
writing. It is implied when the acts and conduct of the owne1· clearly manifest an intention on his part to devote the land to the public use. Whether the dedication be express or
implied, an intention of the owner to appropriate the land to the public use must appear. It is always a question of intention. In
nei'ther case is any particular formality or
form of words necessary. If 'the intention to
dedicate is manifest it is sufficient. An implied dedication is founded on the doetrine of
equitable estoppel, and when land h'as been
thus set apart as a hiighway for the use of the
public, for their convenience and accommodation, and enjoyed as such, and private and individual i·ights acquired in rel'ation to i't, 'The
law,' as said by the Supreme Court of the
United States, 'considers it in 'the nature of
an estoppel in pais, which precludes the original owner from revoking 'Such dedication.' "
Fmther, at page 313, '~he court s'tated:
" 'The intent which the law me'ans is not a
secret one, but is that whlich is expressd in the
visible conduct and open acts of the owner.
The public, as well as individuals, have a
right to rely on the conduct of 'the owner as
indicative of his intent. If the acts are such as
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would fairly and reasonably lead .. 11 . 1
·1
d
.
n
Ul1 '"
art1 y p1d·u hent man to mfer an intent to dt>
ca e an t ey are so received and ad.ell L
by the p1:1blic, the. ow~er cannot, aftel' ;c~J;;':.
ance by. the pubhc, i ecall the appropriai:j, 11 ,
Regard is to be had to the character and 1:n~ 1
of the open. and known acts, and not to am
latent or hidden purpose. If the open anr~
known, acts aye of such a character as to in.
duce 'the belief tha;t the owner intended ;,,
dedicate the way to public use, and the puhlir
and individuals act upon such conduct nu.
ceed as if there had been in fact a cledic~t\r:r
and acquire rights which would be lost if t!1~
owner were allowed to reclaim the land. thL!'
the law will ndt permit him to assert
there wa:s no intent to dedicate, no mattt'
what may have been his secret intent.' Elliut
on Roads and Streets, pages 92, 93."

'(j·

A't page 314, the com~t stated, quoting fro1i·
Wilson v. Hull, 7 Utah 90 :
" 'The 'intention of the owner of the land :1 1
dedicate may be infe1Ted from his acqnie.'
cence in its con'tinual use as a road by th
public. In order to cons'ti tu te acquiescence 1
a legal sense, the owner must know that tl11
public is using his land as a road. There !11ll''
be an act of the mind, a knowle~ge that ti:
pubHc is using the land as a lughway, a1111
a purpose on the part of the owner not r·,
object. A knowledge of the use for such :
purpose, without objection by word or---~c:
may authorize the inference that the u11 ie
consents to the appropriation.' "
This court, in the case of Bamberger Elecf,
1
:

1

Railroad Company, et al, v. Public Utilities Co11ll1i'
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n! l'ia/1,
1:,1.:-:. I

' :

5H Utah 351, 204 P. 314, stated at

;1 j~J :
"~\ uH~re

permissive use of a private road by
rhe ffe11cral public, however long contineud,
will ~10t make it a public highway."
"While it may be that an individual, under
cc1'tai ncircumstances, by long and continued
Uc.if', rnay acquire some rights to use the private marls, that, however, would not make the
road a public road or highway. * * *"
Arneric::rn Law of Property, Volume II, Page
-18:), 484, Paragrap'h C. Prescription, provides:
''In order for 'the prescriptive period to be
J'unning in favor of the public, the use must
be general and not limited to a few specific
indivi(luals. It has been said tha:t the test of
a puulic use is not the frequency of the use
or the number using the way, but its use by
persons who are not separable from the pu'bl'ic
generally. Likewise the use must be substantially along one line of way and not spread
out ovPr a large area. Futrher, the acts must
be such as to impu'te notice to the owner of the
land of the adverse character of the use."
.\t page 484:
"The use must be adverse as dis:tinguished
from permissive in order for prescription to
be running. Thus, a use by the public of a
private way already laid out by the landowner does n'ot become adverse because of
the failure of the landowner to protest for
a long period. Such a use i's no evidence of a
i'laim of i·ight in the public."
The facts, undisputed, in tlris case show a privti: right of way esta!bJiished, as such, as early as
45

72
. years ago, fenced during all of said period, Iear.1
mg_ to the north of lo~ 3 to private homes, all of
which_ by deed were entitled to use the right of Wa\'.
The right of way was not a through street but end.
ed on private ground, used by the people who re.
sided there and the necessary service people friends

etc.

'

I

The owners of the fee never acquiesced in the
general use by the public. Except for a portion of
the i•ight of way that was apparently asphalted
by the dty by mistake, maintenance was solely by
the owners.
The right of way being ten feet wide for the
majority of its length is entirely unsuited for a
public street of any kind. The efforts on the part of
the owners 'to restrict the use of the right of way
to those entitled thereto expresses an obvious in·
tention that a dedication \Vas never intended, ex·
p1·ess or implied, and never acquiesced in.
The minimal use by others of the right of way
does nat constitute a dedication.
Respectfully submitted,
LELAND S. McCULLOUGH
304 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Appellant
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